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          RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
 
     
      
Has Matt failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by 
relinquishing jurisdiction and ordering executed, without reduction, his unified sentence 






Matt Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion 
 On September 26, 2009, Matt drove while intoxicated, with a suspended driver’s 
license and no insurance, and crashed into a vehicle driven by Jan Hopkins while Jan 
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was stopped at a red light.  (PSI, pp.4, 24, 29.1
The state charged Matt with felony DUI (two or more prior DUI convictions within 
10 years).  (R., pp.88-89.)  Pursuant to a plea agreement, Matt pled guilty and the state 
agreed to recommend local jail and probation.  (R., pp.108-09.)  Matt was subsequently 
 
)  Matt “struck the rear bumper of [Jan’s] 
vehicle twice before changing lanes and speeding away from the scene.”  (PSI, p.29.)  
Matt damaged both vehicles and injured Jan.  (PSI, pp.2-3, 51-54.)  An officer located 
Matt in a casino parking lot shortly thereafter.  (PSI, p.2.)  When the officer requested 
Matt’s driver’s license, Matt attempted to hand the officer an unopened can of alcohol.  
(PSI, p.2.)  Matt smelled of alcohol, his eyes were bloodshot, and his speech was 
slurred.  (PSI, p.2.)  When asked about the recent damage to his vehicle, Matt claimed 
he “didn’t know about any damage.”  (PSI, p.2.)  The officer asked Matt to exit his 
vehicle, and as Matt did so a partially empty bottle of vodka fell out of the vehicle.  (PSI, 
p.2.)  Matt staggered toward the back of his vehicle and adopted a posture as if he was 
“preparing to square off against the trooper.  Trooper Ferriss asked Mr. Matt if that was 
his intention, and Mr. Matt stated it was” and that he “wasn’t going to perform field 
sobriety tests.”  (PSI, p.2.)  Matt was taken to the ground and handcuffed.  (PSI, p.2.)  
While en route to the jail, Matt “appeared to pass out,” then regained consciousness 
and vomited several times.  (PSI, pp.2-3.)  After arriving at the jail, Matt “continued to be 
combative and aggressive, including shouting and kicking the door of his cell 
repeatedly.”  (PSI, p.3.)   
                                            
1 PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file 
“Confidential Presentence Report dated July 1, 2010.pdf.”   
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arrested for a new DUI charge in the State of Washington, failed to appear for his 
sentencing hearing on July 7, 2010, and a bench warrant was issued for his arrest.  (R., 
pp.110, 112.)  Matt was arrested on the warrant over three months later.  (R., p.113.)  
Because Matt violated the terms of the plea agreement, the state was released from its 
obligation to recommend probation and instead recommended the retained jurisdiction 
program.  (11/10/10 Tr., p.22, Ls.1-8; p.23, Ls.3-9.)  The district court imposed a unified 
sentence of five years, with two and one-half years fixed, and retained jurisdiction.  (R., 
pp.124-26.)  Following the period of retained jurisdiction, the district court relinquished 
jurisdiction.  (R., pp.143-44.)  Matt filed a notice of appeal timely from the district court’s 
order relinquishing jurisdiction.  (R., pp.148-50.)  He also filed a timely Rule 35 motion 
for a reduction of sentence, which the district court denied.  (R., pp.165-68; Order 
Denying Motion for Reduction of Sentence (Augmentation).)  
Matt asserts that the district court abused its discretion by relinquishing 
jurisdiction and ordering his sentence executed without reduction in light of his mental 
health issues, childhood, prior record, family support, and because, he claims, “his sub-
par performance” in the retained jurisdiction program “was due to the alteration of his 
medication regimen.”  (Appellant’s brief, p.8.)  Matt has failed to establish an abuse of 
sentencing discretion.  
“Probation is a matter left to the sound discretion of the court.”  I.C. § 19-2601(4). 
 The decision to relinquish jurisdiction is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial 
court and will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion.  See 
State v. Hood, 102 Idaho 711, 712, 639 P.2d 9, 10 (1981); State v. Lee, 117 Idaho 203, 
205-06, 786 P.2d 594, 596-97 (Ct. App. 1990).  A court’s decision to relinquish 
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jurisdiction will not be deemed an abuse of discretion if the trial court has sufficient 
information to determine that a suspended sentence and probation would be 
inappropriate under I.C. § 19-2521.  State v. Chapel
Pursuant Idaho Criminal Rule 35, a court may reduce a sentence within 120 days 
after the court releases retained jurisdiction.  A court’s decision not to reduce a 
sentence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion subject to the well-established 
standards governing whether a sentence is excessive.  
, 107 Idaho 193, 194, 687 P.2d 583, 
584 (Ct. App. 1984).   
State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 
26, 28, 218 P.3d 5, 7 (Ct. App. 2009) (citing State v. Beckett, 122 Idaho 324, 326, 834 
P.2d 326, 328 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Marks, 116 Idaho 976, 977, 783 P.2d 315, 316 
(Ct. App. 1989)).  Those standards require an appellant to “establish that, under any 
reasonable view of the facts, the sentence was excessive considering the objectives of 
criminal punishment.”  State v. Stover, 140 Idaho 927, 933, 104 P.3d 969, 975 (2005). 
 Those objectives are: “(1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the 
public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for 
wrong doing.”  State v. Wolfe
The district court’s decision to relinquish jurisdiction and order Matt’s sentence 
executed without reduction was reasonable in light of Matt’s ongoing disregard for the 
law and the safety of others, the danger he poses to the community, and his failure to 
demonstrate amenability to community-based programming.  Matt presents a great 
danger to the community based on his criminal history alone.  That Matt has repeatedly 
made the decision to endanger the community by driving while intoxicated is itself 
aggravating.  (PSI, pp.4-6.)   Even more egregious, however, is the fact that Matt has, 
, 99 Idaho 382, 384, 582, P.2d 728, 730 (1978).   
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on at least four of those occasions, also caused an accident and then attempted to flee.  
(PSI, pp.4-6.)   
At the time that he committed the instant offense, Matt had been convicted of 
DUI and hit and run on two separate occasions, most recently in 2004.  (PSI, pp.4-5.)  
Although he had already caused damage and/or harm to at least two different victims as 
a result of his drinking and disregard for the law, Matt was undeterred and continued to 
consume alcohol and drive without privileges.  (PSI, pp.5-6.)  He was convicted of 
failure to purchase a driver’s license, amended from DWP, in 2005.  (PSI, p.5.)  In 2006, 
he was convicted of DUI, amended from DUI – Excessive.  (PSI, p.5.)  In 2007, Matt 
was again convicted of failure to purchase a driver’s license, amended from DWP.  
(PSI, p.6.)   
When he committed the instant offense, Matt was again driving without 
privileges, admitted that he had not had car insurance since 1999, had an open 
container of alcohol in his vehicle, and was literally drinking while driving.  (PSI, pp.4-5, 
24.)  He hit the victim’s vehicle, which was stopped at a red light, twice before fleeing 
the scene.  (PSI, p.29.)  Matt caused damage to both vehicles and injured the other 
driver.  (PSI, pp.2-4, 51-54.)  He did not check on the welfare of the other driver and 
instead drove to a casino and, when contacted by police, continued his attempts to 
avoid responsibility by lying to the officer and claiming he “didn’t know about any 
damage” to his vehicle.  (PSI, p.2.)  Matt was uncooperative and combative with the 
police and jail staff.  (PSI, pp.2-3.)   
Matt pled guilty to the instant offense on April 28, 2010.  (R., pp.108-09.)  Just 
two months later, he again drove while intoxicated and caused a wreck.  (PSI, p.6.)  He 
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subsequently lied to police, claiming that his friend “John Doe” had been driving and ran 
away after the wreck.  (PSI, p.6.)  Once again, Matt failed to cooperate with officers and 
resisted their attempts to handcuff him upon his arrest.  (PSI, p.6.)   
At Matt’s sentencing hearing for the instant offense, the district court noted that it 
had “some real concerns about [Matt’s] potential to commit further offenses” (11/10/10 
Tr., p.24, Ls.5-7), and stated, “I think where you have that number of DUIs, it is certainly 
something that calls for punishment especially where an accident has resulted that’s 
what led to this DUI charge being made” (11/10/10 Tr., p.25, Ls.13-19).  The sentence 
imposed was appropriate in light of the seriousness of the offense, the danger Matt 
presents to the community, and Matt’s continuing criminal behavior, disregard for the 
safety of others, and attempts to avoid responsibility for his crimes.  The sentence 
addressed both the goals of rehabilitation and protection of the community by affording 
Matt the opportunity to participate in rehabilitative programming in a secure 
environment.     
As Matt acknowledges on appeal, he performed poorly in the retained jurisdiction 
program.  (Appellant’s brief, p.8.)  The CAPP Placement Coordinator advised that Matt 
“was reviewed by the IDOC clinical team and it was determined mental health was not 
preventing his ability to complete the program.”  (Confidential Email, p.1.)  Nevertheless, 
Matt claims that his poor conduct in the program was due entirely to “the alteration of 
his medication regimen” (Appellant’s brief, p.8), and that “when he is receiving a stable 
medication regimen, he is able to function” (Appellant’s brief, p.14).  However, it is 
noteworthy that Matt was on his preferred medication regimen for several years before 
he committed the instant offense.  (PSI, p.9.)  During that time, he was “unable to work 
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because he has panic attacks and symptoms of anxiety and Bipolar Disorder, even 
when he is taking his medication.”  (PSI, p.9.)  Matt committed both the instant offense 
and a subsequent DUI, in which he again crashed a vehicle, while on his preferred 
medication regimen.  (PSI, pp.2-3, 6, 9.)  He then attributed his crimes to his mental 
health.  (PSI, pp.4, 11.)  Given that Matt suffered from “panic attacks and symptoms of 
anxiety and Bipolar Disorder,” was unable to hold employment, disregarded the rules 
and engaged in criminal behavior, and consistently attempted to avoid responsibility for 
his conduct while on his preferred medication regimen, his continuation of the same 
type of behavior during his period of retained jurisdiction makes his claim that such 
behavior was attributable solely to a change in medication highly doubtful.   
Matt asserts that, despite his change in medication, he retained “some ability to 
function” and was “putting forth the effort to succeed” while in the retained jurisdiction 
program.  (Appellant’s brief, p.14.)  Although Matt participated minimally in some of the 
programming while on his rider, his counselor and class facilitator reported that Matt 
“got off to a poor start,” refused to participate, and “looked for excuses to return to his 
unit instead of engaging with his group and learning ways to adapt to his new 
environment.”  (APSI, p.4.)  During orientation, Matt was “unwilling to complete his first 
rough draft of his Relapse Prevention Plan and refused to work on it during his time in 
programming.”  (APSI, pp.4, 6.)  CAPP staff reported that Matt was “unwilling to even 
attempt to attend” his community group sessions.  (APSI, p.5.)  He did not complete any 
of the steps in MRT, only “reluctantly” attending “a few classes.”  (APSI, p.5.)  Matt “did 
not attend enough to report any progress” in TAP 19, Work Force Readiness, Partners 
in Parenting, or Pre-Release.  (APSI, p.5.)  Staff reports included statements that Matt 
 8 
“continually reported to medical to find ways to avoid the structure of the classroom 
setting” and “would always look for a way to go to medical especially on days that 
Community Group took place.”  (APSI, p.5.)   
On January 10, 2011, Matt incurred a DOR for disobedience to orders after he 
“refused to participate in programming … got up from his seat, took his class materials 
and left the classroom.  Mr. Matt ignored questions from staff about what he was doing 
and was advised he was being given a direct order to return to class.  Mr. Matt ignored 
that order, waived his hand above his head and continued walking.”  (APSI, p.3.)  On 
January 19, 2011, Matt told his class facilitator that he “had been taken off his mental 
health medication and felt he was doing well with it at that time.  However, in later 
conversations with the Program Manager and his Case Manager, he admitted he 
stopped taking the mental health medication of his own volition.”  (APSI, p.4.)  On 
January 24, 2011, Matt incurred a DOR for manipulating staff.  (APSI, p.3.)  At that time 
he told staff that he “thought he ‘needed to hurt someone,’” had “thought about 
escaping,” and he thought he “‘just need[ed] four walls to stare at for awhile.’”  (APSI, 
p.3.)  After being placed in segregation, Matt vacillated over whether he wanted to 
program and advised that his motivation to continue programming at CAPP was 
“extremely low.”  (APSI, pp.4-5.)   
CAPP recommended that the district court relinquish jurisdiction, noting that 
Matt’s “behavior both in class and on his housing unit indicates a disregard for meeting 
any CAPP expectations.  …  He has made no attempt to participate in class or complete 
assignments that would demonstrate a desire to be in recovery.  He has only created 
ways to avoid programming.”  (APSI, p.6.)  The IDOC Clinical Supervisor reported: 
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Despite Mr. Matt’s presenting diagnosis, he was capable of participating in 
both a general population and also in substance dependence treatment.  
As noted in his APSI, he refused programming, and would defer his 
treatment needs for his alcohol addiction to his mental health medications. 
…  
 
His presentation is similar to other alcoholic individuals who do not 
recognize physical sensation and feelings as within a normal range of 
experience.  Avoidance of feeling by medicating with a mood altering 
substance is easier than processing thoughts and feelings in a community 
treatment setting.  Likewise, benzodiazepines impact the central nervous 
system in a similar manner as alcohol, and are also addictive, which is 
why it is contradindicated to prescribe benzodiazepines (such as 
Klonopin) to recovering alcoholics, especially those who are noted for 




Mr. Matt’s behavior is consistent with manipulations to avoid 
personal responsibility for his actions and/or commitment to his own 
recovery.   
 
(5/6/11 Letter from J. Sheehan, pp.1-2.)   
The district court considered all of the relevant information and reasonably 
determined that Matt was not an appropriate candidate for community supervision.  The 
court’s decision to relinquish jurisdiction was reasonable in light of Matt’s refusal to 
participate in programming and his failure to reduce his risk to the community.  His 
sentence was appropriate as imposed, and his abysmal performance in the retained 
jurisdiction program did not merit a reduction of sentence.  Given any reasonable view 
of the facts, Matt has failed to establish an abuse of sentencing discretion.    
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Conclusion 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court’s order 
relinquishing jurisdiction and ordering Matt’s sentence executed without reduction. 
       




      _/s/_____________________________ 
      LORI A. FLEMING 
      Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
      VICTORIA RUTLEDGE 
      Paralegal 
 
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
 I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 11th day of April, 2012, served a true and 
correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF by emailing an electronic copy to: 
 
BRIAN R. DICKSON  
  DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
 




      _/s/_____________________________ 
     LORI A. FLEMING 
Deputy Attorney General    
   
